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THE PATENTABILITY, OF LIVING MATTER:
HEY WAITER, WHAT'S CHAKRABARTY'S
PSEUDOMONAS BACTERIUM DOING BACK
IN THE SUPREME COURT'S SOUP?
The Constitution provides Congress with the power to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.' Accordingly, Congress enacted the
patent laws2 to provide economic stimulus3 for the invention of any ma-
chine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter,' and to promote
the dissemination of new ideas and discoveries.' Cognizant of the need to
balance the economic interests of inventors with the interests of the public,
Congress designed the patent statutes to prevent the patenting of inven-
tions which do not constitute advances in science or technology. Statutory
requirements, therefore, preclude the patenting of subject matter which is
either known of or used by any other persons, or which was obvious at the
time of invention, even though such subject matter falls within the cate-
gories eligible for patent protection.' Similarly, in interpreting the patent
statutes, courts have fashioned limits to patentability, including rules
'The Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power...
[8] To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by.securing for
Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries; . . . [and]
[18] To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 8, 18.
2 The Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-
293 (1976)).
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). The patenting of an invention gives the inventor the exclu-
sive right to make, use, or sell the invention throughout the United States for a period of 17
years. Id. The stimulus provided by these short-term monopolies is enhanced by statutes
permitting the assignment of patent rights. See id. §§ 152, 154. Companies can therefore
invest heavily in research and benefit from the inventions of employees through the compul-
sory assignment of employees' patent rights to the employer. See text accompanying notes
116-18 infra.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
See id. § 111. An application for a patent must include meticulous written specifica-
tions of the subject matter and, where appropriate, detailed drawings. Id. 99 111-113. If a
patent is issued, the Commissioner of patents is authorized to furnish copies of the specifica-
tions and drawings either to the public or to persons applying for the materials, to print the
specifications and drawings, and to supply public libraries with copies of them. Id. §§ 10,
11(a)(1), 13. Before the patent is issued, however, the Patent Office must keep the patent
applications in confidence. Id. § 122.
1 Id. § 102-103. Sections 102 and 103 of the patent statutes establish conditions which
must be met if subject matter is to be patented. These requirements prevent the patenting
of subject matter which is not sufficiently inventive to warrant patent protection, thereby
protecting the public from being deprived of articles and processes which are already availa-
ble. Id.
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governing patents for. the phenomena of nature.
7
In the recent case of In re Bergy (Bergy II), a divided Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA) held that living matter is within the
scope of potentially patentable subject matter The CCPA first decided
that living things are patentable in In re Bergy ° (Bergy I), by overruling a
contrary decision made by the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO)."-Shortly thereafter, in In re Chakrabarty, 11 the CCPA
relied on Bergy I as controlling precedent for the question of the patent-
ability of living matter." The Supreme Court vacated Bergy I, however,
and directed the CCPA to reconsider the case in light of Parker v. Flook,
a recent Supreme Court case interpreting the Patent Act." Due to the
similarity of the issues in Bergy I and Chakrabarty, the CCPA vacated its
decision in Chakrabarty and reheard the cases together in Bergy II.11
In Parker v. Flook,'" the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a limited category of useful, though conventional, post-solution
applications of an improved method of calculation is patentable.'7 The
Court held that an improved method of calculation, even though tied to a
7 See text accompanying notes 23-38 infra.
596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
1 Id. at 973.
0 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902
(1978), aff'd on rehearing sub nom. In re Bergy (Bergy II), 596 F.2d 592 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Diamond v. Bergy, 48 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1980)
(No. 79-136) dismissed-F.2d-(C.C.P.A. 1980); see text accompanying note 104 infra. In Bergy
I, the CCPA held that a man-made, pure culture of a naturally occurring microorganism is
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 563 F.2d at 1035; see text accompanying
notes 1-7 supra. The only issue before the court in Bergy I was whether the fact that the
pure culture was alive removed it from the classes of patentable subject matter enumerated
in § 101. 563 F.2d at 1035.
"' Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78 (Bd. App. 1976).
12 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nom. Banner v. Chakrabarty, 439
U.S. 801 (1979), aff'd on rehearing sub nom. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 592 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert.
granted sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979). In Chakrabarty, the CCPA held
that a novel, manmade, genetically engineered strain of microorganism was patentable sub-
ject matter as defined in § 101. 571 F.2d at 43; see text accompanying notes 44-50 infra. The
issue before the court in Chakrabarty was identical to the issue in Bergy I: whether the fact
that the microorganism was alive removed it from the scope of patentable subject matter.
571 F.2d at 43; see note 10 supra.
'3 571 F.2d at 43.
14 Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978); see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); text
accompanying notes 16-38 infra.
5 See Bergy II, 596 F.2d 952, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1979); notes 10 & 12 supra.
I 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
'7 Id. at 585. Flook's improved method of calculation was a method of updating "alarm
limits" in catalytic conversion processes. Id. The Court defined "alarm limit" as a number
representing maximum and minimum levels for certain "process variables" in the reaction.
Inefficiency or danger potentially exists when these process variables, such as temperature
and pressure, go beyond the proper maximum and minimum levels for the given stage of the
reaction. Although the alarm limits remain essentially the same during steady operational
stages of the catalytic conversion process, the limits must be updated during periods when
the process variables are constantly changing, such as the start-up period. Id. at 585, 596.
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specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter."8 Additionally, the Court
recognized a relationship between the patenting of Flook's claimed
method of calculation and the patenting of computer programs. 9 The
Court declared that, as a matter of policy, prior cases interpreting the
Patent Act should be followed carefully, and that caution must be exer-
cised when patent rights are extended into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress."0 This policy rests on the principle thatc.ourts should not ex-
pand patent protection by overruling or modifying prior cases construing
the Patent Act without a clear and certain signal from Congress." There-
fore, even though the cases the Court relied upon in Flook were decided
before the development of computer technology, the Court felt that any
decisions to modify patent law so as to permit the patenting of computer
programs should be made by Congress.
2
The cases the Supreme Court relied upon in Flook concerned the pat-
entability of phenomena of nature.2 Although the Patent Act has no pro-
Flook's improvement in the method of calculation was the addition of an intermediate
step to a conventional method of calculation. Id. at 585-86. The new intermedite step was
based on a newly discovered algorithm. Id. at 585. The Court defined "algorithm" as a pro-
cedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem. Id. at 585 n.1. The Court estab-
lished this definition of algorithm in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). In Gott-
schalk, the Court, relying on the rule that a mathematical formula is an unpatentable
phenomenon of nature, held that when an algorithm has no practical application except for
use with a computer, then the computer program using the algorithm is unpatentable, be-
cause the program would wholly preempt the use of the algorithm. 409 U.S at 71-72; see text
accompanying note 29 infra.
,1 437 U.S. at 595-96.
I' d.
2' Id. The principle of following established judicial interpretations of patent law when
faced with potential expansion of patent privileges was set forth in Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).,In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit and held that the activities of defendant Deepsouth Packing Company did not
infringe Laitram Corporation's patent for a shrimp deveining machine. Id. at 528. Deepsouth
had manufactured all the parts for the patented machine and sold them abroad, where the
machines could be assembled in a matter of hours. Id. at 524. Defining the term "make" as
used in the patent infringement statute, see 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976), as "the substantial
manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine," the Fifth Circuit had held that Deep-
south had made the patented machine, thereby infringing upon Laitram's patent rights. Lai-
tram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court
held, however, that the established definition of the term "make" protected patentees only
against the full and operable assembly of the patented subject matter, and that the Court
would not modify that established interpretation of the patent statute in order to expand the
rights of the patentee. 409 U.S. at 528, 531.
2, See note 20 supra; note 22 infra.
" 437 U.S. at 596. Policy matters regarding the patenting of computer programs which
Congress, not the Court, should decide, include questions concerning the types or programs
which should be patented and the duration of the protection to be given the programs. Id. at
595; see, e.g., Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RUTGERS J. OF
CompurERs AND THE LAW 1.
n 437 U.S. at 591. The Flook opinion suggests two bases upon which the Court made its
decision. The Court reasoned that an algorithm is a phenomenon of nature and, since phe-
nomena of nature are unpatentable, Flook's algorithm is unpatentable. Id. at 591-92; see
19801
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visions concerning phenomena of nature, the courts have developed sev-
eral rules limiting their patentability. Fundamental to the phenomena of
nature rules is the principle that the phenomena are not "inventions," nor
are discoveries of phenomena of nature "discoveries" as defined by the
Patent Act.2 Consequently, while a phenomenon of nature is unpatent-
able for want of invention, an inventive application of a phenomenon of
nature is patentable.
2 5
In order for subject matter which embodies a phenomenon of nature to
be patentable, the invention of the subject matter must have required
more than the ordinary skill of a person in the art or profession given the
state of the prior art when the subject matter was made.2 Furthermore,
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 .U.S. 63, 67 (1972). As a phenomenon of nature, Flook's newly
discovered algorithm must be treated as though it were well known for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the method of calculation was patentable. 437 U.S. at 592; see O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115 (1853). The test for determining whether Flook's method of
calculation is patentable is whether the process itself, not merely the algorithm, is new and
useful. 437 U.S. at 591; see Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127; 130
(1948); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). In holding Flook's method
of calculation unpatentable, the Court implicitly held that the method of calculation was
not new and useful.
The Court did not rest its decision on this reasoning, however, relying instead on the
CCPA's decision in In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 437 U.S. at 595. In Rich-
man, the CCPA held that if a patent claim is directed essentially to a method of calculation,
even though the method employs a new mathematical equation and is limited to a specific
post calculation solution, the claimed method is unpatentable. 563 F.2d at 1030. Although
the Richman holding is based on the phenomena of nature rules, the holding in that case
does not require the application of all the rules discussed in Flook. Id. Therefore, the Court's
review of the phenomena of nature rules in Flook is dictum. See Note, Parker v. Flook and
Computer Program Patents, 30 HAsrmos L.J. 1627 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Computer
Program Patents]. See generally Bergy I, 596 F.2d 952, 988-95 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
u See, e.g., 437 U.S. at 593. In Flook, the Supreme Court explained that the prohibition
of the patenting of phenomena of nature rests on the "fundamental understanding" that
discoveries of phenomena of nature are not "discoveries" within the meaning of § 101. Id;
see text accompanying note 4 supra.
11 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). In Mackay Radio, the Court held that a patent
for an antenna system, the dimensions of which were determined in accordance with princi-
ples of electro-magnetic wave propogation and the phenomenon of standing waves, was
valid. Id. at 91-92, 101. Although the principles upon which the system was based were
unpatentable phenomena of nature, the antenna system was an inventive application of the
pehnomena. Id. at 101. See also text accompanying notes 89-97 infra.
26 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948); Armour
Pharm. Co. v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 396 F.2d 70, 79 (3d Cir. 1968). In Armour, the court
held a patent which had been issued for an enzyme with known medicinal value invalid. Id.
at 71, 75. The enzyme had been treated in order that the drug could be administered orally.
Id. at 71, 74-75. The court held that the patent was based on the discovery of the phenome-
non of nature that the lower portion of the small intenstine absorbed the enzyme. Id. at 74.
Once the patentee made this discovery, any artisan would have known the process of enteri-
cally coating the enzyme to enable it to pass through the digestive system to the small inten-
stine. Id. Therefore, the subject matter of the patent did not constitute an inventive applica-
tion of a phenomenon of nature. Id. The Ninth Circuit used a similar standard in National
Lead Co. v. Western Lead Prod. Co., 329 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963). The National Lead Coin-
[Vol. XXXVII
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the Supreme Court has held all phenomena of nature, even though newly
discovered, are treated as though they are well known aspects of the prior
art." As the Supreme Court has recognized, these rules preclude the pat-
pany held a patent for a process for tfie manufacture of a composition of lead particles and
lead oxides. Id. at 540. The process was a modification of a conventional process. Id. The
improvement was based on the patentee's discoveries that two lead oxides instead of one
were present in the composition, and that the temperature used..for the process had direct
effects on the product. Id. at 541. The court held that these discoveries were discoveries of
pehnomena of nature. Id. at 545. Based on this holding, the court held the patent for the
process invalid, because once these phenomena of nature were discovered, an artisan re-
quired no more than the ordinary skill of the profession to develop the improved process. See
id. See also In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686 (C.C.P.A. 1950). The Arnold court denied a patent for
an improved method of the old art of bonding materials by passing high frequency current
between electrodes applied to opposite sides of materials to be bonded, thereby activating a
cement placed between them. Id. at 691. The improvement was based on the discovery that
electric current affects the surface molecules of the cement and materials to be bonded dif-
ferently than the molecules in the inner layers of the materials. Id. The court held that once
these characteristics had been discovered, the improvement in the process based on altering
the frequency of the current was not invention. Id. The Seventh Circuit used the "more than
the ordinary skill of the profession" requirement in Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems.,
Inc., 179 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1950). The Davison Chemical Corporation held a patent on an
improved process for the production of silicagel. Id. at 793-94. The improvement consisted
of changing the temperature of the wash water in tlie process, which was found to change the
structure of the silica product. Id. at 794. The court held, however, that the relationship
between the wash water temperature and the structure of the silica was a phenomenon of
nature. Id. at 794-95. Therefore, once this phenomenon was discovered, a person familiar
with the process needed to apply only the ordinary skill of'the profession to make the im-
provement in the otherwise generally used process. Id.
The "ordinary skill" requirement used by courts to determine sufficiency of invention
for applied phenomena of nature is almost identical to the invention r quirement set forth in
the patent statutes. The patent statutes provide, in pertinent part:
A patent may, not be obtained. .. if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit decided National Lead specifically
on the basis of § 103. 324 F.2d at 544. In ,Flook, how'ever, the Supreme Court held that the
inventive application of a phenomenon of nature test is based on the invention requirement
of § 101. 437 U.S. at 588, 592. Flook argued that the Cburt was improperly importing the
inventiveness requirements of § .103 to §, 101, thereby making bad law by giving courts two
standards on which to determine inventiveness. Id. at 592-93. The dissent in Flook and the
majority in Bergy II also objected vehemently to the Supenie Court's holding that § 101
controls. Id at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Bergy 11, 596 F.2d 952, 962764 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
See also, Computer Program Patents, supra note 23, 1634-35..The issue of whether the statu-
tory basis of the test is § 103 or § 101 is irrelevant to the question of whether specific subject
matter is patentable, however, because the standard for the test is the same regardless of its
statutory basis. "
1 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978); See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inocu-
lant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) ("once nature's secret of the noninhibitive quality of cer-
tain strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered, the state of the art made the pro-
duction of a mixed inoculant a simple step"); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115-
16 (1853) (when determining whether machine embodying phenomenon of nature is patenta-
ble, courts must consider case "as if the principle [is] well known"). In Bergy II, the CCPA
1980]
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enting of fundamental applications of phenomena of nature. 8 These rules,
therefore, conform to the general policy underlying the phenomenon of
nature rules of preventing persons from using patent protection to wholly
preclude the use of a phenomenon of nature. 9
When applying the phenomena of nature rules, a court must first de-
termine whether the patent claim is based on a phenomenon of nature,M
and, if so, the court must define the phenomenon for the given case. Al-
though courts have failed to define adequately the term "phenomenon of
nature,"'" the cases cited in Parker v. Flook show that the following clas-
ses are included within the scope of the term. Physical laws of nature,
such as gravity, 2 and physical properties of nature, such as the heat of
the sun and electricity," are phenomena of nature. Other physical proper-
ties which are phenomena of nature are the inherent physical properties of
stated that the rule that newly discovered phenomena of nature are included in the prior art
was a "novel principle" with "consequences of unforeseeable magnitude." 596 F.2d at 965.
The court decided, however, that the rule had no bearing on Bergy f, because the phenom-
ena of nature rules were inapplicable to the case. Id. at 965-66. Given the tests used in Morse
and Funk Brothers, the CCPA's objection does not appear to be valid. But see Computer
Program Patents, supra note 23.
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972). See also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). The Supreme Court's opposition to the use of pat-
ents to monopolize a phenomenon of nature is best evidenced by Benson. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
In Benson, the Supreme Court held a computer program which was not tied to a specific use
unpatentable, because the patent would wholly preempt the use of the mathematical equa-
tion upon which the program was based. Id. at 71-72. Although recognizing that the equa-
tion could conceivably be used in other ways than with the program, the Court held that the
only "substantial practical application" of the equation was in use with computers. Id.
Mathematical equations are phenomenon of nature. Id; see text accompanying notes 36-38
infra.
As Judge Baldwin noted in the dissenting opinion in Bergy II, the Supreme Court has
analyzed phenomena of nature cases in terms of the phenomenon of nature which made the
invention valuable. 596 F.2d at 996 (Baldwin, J., concurring); see, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128-30 (1948) (patent for bacterial fertilizer held invalid
because value of patent rested on properties of bacteria, which are phenomena of nature).
31 Courts have used the terms "phenomena of nature," "laws of nature," "principles of
nature," and "fundamental truths" synonymously. See Bergy I, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A.
1979). The inadequate definition of these terms is attributable partially to the fact they are
"vague and maleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation." Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 135 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32 See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
In Eibel Process, a machine which had an elevated end to increase the flow rate was held to
embody the natural phenomenon of gravity. Id. at 50. The machine was held patentable,
however, and later courts recognize the machine as an inventive application of a phenome-
non of nature. Id. at 69; see, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
" See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (recognizing
that heat of the sun and electricity are phenomena of nature); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 61, 112-13 (1853) (ability of electro-magnetic current to print intelligible signs at a
distance held a phenomenon of nature); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 179 (1852)
(recognizing that electricity, and "any other power in nature" are phenomena of nature).
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naturally occurring animate and inanimate matter. 4 The scope of this
class of phenomena is not well defined, however, due to imprecise defini-
tion of the term "inherent properties." The decisions concerning this class
of phenomena indicate, however, that a property is inherent in matter
even though the property is only exhibited under conditions which do not
exist in nature." The term "phenomena of nature" also includes all math-
ematical equations and methods of calculation. " Equations are considered
phenomena of nature, because they only recognize and express relation-
ships which exist despite any contribution of the discoveror. 7 Therefore,
the mathematical expression of laws of nature and properties of nature
are also phenomena of nature.3
In applying Parker v. Flook to the appeals of Bergy and Chakrabarty,
the majority in Bergy II first concluded that the holding of Flook, which
concerned methods of calculation, was clearly inapplicable to the patent
claims in question. " Bergy's patent application requested patent protec-
tion for a new process for the preparation of an antibiotic which used a
newly discovered microorganism, and for a biologically pure culture of the
newly discovered microorganism.40 Bergy received a patent for the process
for the production of the antibiotic, but the patent examiner rejected the
claim for patent protection for the pure culture of the microorganism on
the grounds that it was a product of nature. 1 The PTO Board of Appeals
" Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (properties in
strains of bacteria held phenomena of nature); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
175-76 (1852) (properties of lead held phenomena of nature).
See, e.g., Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1950)
(property in silicon demonstrated only when silicon subjected to extremely high tempera-
tures held phenomenon of nature). In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 691 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (proper-
ties in molecules when subjected to extremely high frequency electricity held phenomena of
nature).
" See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.19 (1978); In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978).
See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939) (mathematical
expression of principle of electro-magnetic wave propogation held a phenomenon of nature).
1' 596 F.2d at 965. Malcolm E. Bergy, John H. Coats and Vedpol S. Malik, referred to
collectively as "Bergy," were scientists for the Upjohn Company, to which they had assigned
their patent rights. Bergy I, 563 F.2d 1031, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Similarly, Anada M.
Chakrabarty was a Staff Biologist in the Research and Development Center of General Elec-
tric Company, to which he had assigned his patent rights. Bergy II, 596 F.2d 952, 968
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
11 U.S. Pat. App. No. 477,776 (June 10, 1974). Bergy's claim for the biologically pure
culture of Streptomyces vellosus was made by amendment to the orginal patent application.
596 F.2d at 967.
" 596 F.2d at 968, 972. Courts use product of nature rules, like the phenomena of nature
rules, to withhold patent protection from subject matter which is not sufficiently inventive
to warrant patent protection. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d
156, 161-64 (4th Cir. 1958). Products of nature rules are used most frequently where a sub-
stance or an element which exists in nature has been purified, and that non-naturally occur-
ring pure form of the substance has been patented. See General Elec. Co. v. DeForest Radio
Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1928) (patent for substantially
1980]
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upheld the rejection of the claim for patent protection for the pure cul-
ture, but ignored the patent examiner's grounds for the decision." The
Board's reason for rejection was that the pure culture was alive, thus ex-
cluding it from the scope of patentable subject matter. 43
Unlike Bergy's patent claim for a pure culture of a naturally occurring
microorganism, Chakrabarty's patent application requested patent pro-
tection for a new, man-made strain of microorganism." Chakrabarty had
invented the new strain of microorganism by altering the genetic structure
of a naturally occurring bacterium. 5 The new microorganisi had the ca-
pacity to degrade several components of crude oil, and was thus useful in
controlling oil spills on the oceans." Other known naturally occurring bac-
teria had the capacity to degrade single components of crude oil, but the
known microorganisms had different environmental requirements for ef-
fective degradation.47 Consequently, Chakrabarty's strain of the microor-
ganism was more effective than a mixed culture of the known, naturally
occurring bacteria." The patent examiner rejected Chakrabarty's claim
pure tungsten which exists in nature only in oxidized form held invalid); In re Marden, 47
F.2d 957, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (pure uranium held unpatentable); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958,
959 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (pure vanadium held unpatentable). The circuit courts are divided on
the use of product of nature rules, however, with some courts finding product of nature rules
unacceptable. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 101-02 (S.D.N.Y.
1911), aff'd, 196 F. 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1912) (adrenelin extracted from glands of animals held
patentable). See generally, Guttang, The Patentability of Microroganisms: Statutory Sub-
ject Matter and Other Living Things, 13 U. ICH. L. Rlv. 247 (1979); Note, Patent
Law-Patentability as Affected by the Law of Nature Rules-The Kalo Doctrine, 47 MicH.
L. REa. 391 (1949).
4 See 596 F.2d at 971-72.
0 See Bergy I, 563 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The PTO Board recognized that
the patentability of living matter was a question of first impression on which there was no
guiding precedent, but refused to patent living things on the grounds that the patent statute
must be construed narrowly. Id. at 1033; see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The Board also main-
tained that the Plant Patent Act is evidence that living matter not covered by that act is
unpatentable. 563 F.2d at 1034. But see text accompanying notes 109-115 infra.
11 U.S. Pat. App. No. 260,563 (June 7, 1972); Bergy H, 596 F.2d 952, 969-70 (C.C.P.A.
1979). In addition to the claim for the microorganism itself, Chakrabarty sought patent pro-
tection for an inoculum for the degradation of certain hydrocarbons, which consisted essen-
tially of bacteria, at least some of which were the bacteria Chakrabary had created; for an
iinculfied medium for degrading oil spills, the inoculum consisting of straw or other mate-
rial which floats on water that had been inoculated with Chakrabarty's bacteria; and finally,
for the process or improvement in a process of altering the genetic structure of the micro-
organisms. Id. at 970-71.
,1 Id. at 968-70. Through a process known as genetic engineering, or plasmid engineer-
ing, scientists are able to alter the genetic makeup of simple organisms by splicing the DNA
molecules of similar species, thereby creating a new composite genetic structure. DNA, or
deoxyrhibonucleic acid, is the vital component in genetic material which controls the entire
nature of an organism. Therefore, by altering the DNA molecules, scientists can create a
new organism whose novel genetic structure distinguishes it from all other living matter.
Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, Scientific American, July 1975, at 24-33.
" 596 F.2d at 968.
, Id. at 969.
0Id.
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for the microorganism on grounds that the microorganisms were a product
of nature and further, because the microorganisms were alive. 9 The PTO
Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's holding, but, as with Bergy's




Perceiving a duty to find any possible application of Flook to the ap-
peals of Bergy and Chakrabarty, the CCPA then reviewed the phenomena
of nature rules discussed in Ftook.5 ' The majority found that Bergy's and
Chakrabarty's claims did not involve phenomena of nature, however,
thereby holding the phenomena of nature rules inapplicable to the cases.2
The opinion did not give any explanation in support of this holding.
Citing the fact that the patentability of living matter was a question of
first impression in the courts and that the question did not involve any
established law, the majority rejected the PTO's argument that the policy
language in Flook regarding the expansion of patent law precludes the
patenting of living things. Under the majority's interpretation of the pol-
icy language in Flook, the policy applies only when well established law is
changed by decisions expanding patent law. 4 Furthermore, the majority
emphasized that its decision did not expand patent law. According to the
majority, decisions defining patentable subject matter for the first time do
not expand the law, but instead define the congressional purpose underly-
ing the statute." Given the court's duty to decide questions of first im-
, Id. at 970. In addition to rejecting the patent claim on the microorganism, the patent
examiner rejected Chakrabarty's claim for the inoculum which consisted, in part, of
Chakrabarty's microorganism. Id.; see note 44 supra. The patent examiner issued patents,
however, for the medium inoculated with the bacteria and for the process for the creation of
the microorganism. 596 F.2d at 971; see note 44 supra.
-0 See 596 F.2d at 970-71. The board held that a- narrow reading of the patent statutes
precluded the patenting of living matter. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also note 43 supra.
" 596 F.2d at 965.
52 Id. at 965-66. The CCPA characterized the Supreme Court's discussion of phenomena
of nature as a review of "hornbook law" which was inapplicable to the appeals of Bergy and
Chakrabarty. Id. at 965. The CCPA sharply criticized the Supreme Court's holding in Flook
that the inventive application of a phenomenon of nature test was based on 35 U.S.C. § 101
rather than 35 U.S.C. § 103, as well as the Court's holding that newly discovered phenomena
of nature are part of the prior art. id.; see text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. These criti-
cisms of the Supreme Court's Flook opinion had no bearing on the Bergy i decision, how-
ever, because the CCPA had decided that the phenomena of nature rules were inapplicable
to the cases. 596 F.2d at 965.
" 596 F.2d at 966-67; see text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
" 596 F.2d at 966-67. The CCPA's interpretation of the policy language in Flook was
based on an examination of the language in the context of Flook and Deepsouth Packing.
The Bergy I majority emphasized that when used by the Supreme Court, the policy against
expanding patent rights was invoked to prevent the overruling of established cases defining
the breadth of the patent statutes. Id.; see note 20 supra. The majority concluded that appli-
cation of policy language established in this manner to Bergy 11 would have wrenched the
language "out of the context in which it belongs and use[d] it in a manner unwarranted by
the situation which spawned it." 596 F.2d at 966.
" 596 F.2d at 967, 984-87; see text accompanying notes 81-82 infra.
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pression, the majority merely exercised its discretion in deciding that mi-
croorganisms are patentable."
By holding Flook inapplicable to the appeals, the CCPA had decided
that Bergy's and Chakrabarty's claims were not barred by the established
limitations on patentable subject mater.57 Therefore, the only issue left
before the court was whether an otherwise patentable invention is ex-
cluded from the categories of patentable subject matter solely because the
invention is alive." Relying on a broad interpretation of the statute defin-
ing patentable subject matter, the court held that the fact that something
is alive has no legal significance with respect to its patentability." The
majority found that Congress defined the categories of patentable subject
matter broadly in order to provide a flexible law capable of encompassing
unforeseeable technological develoments. 0 In support of this interpreta-
tion, the majority quoted language from the legislative history of the Pat-
ent Act defining patentable subject matter as "anything under the sun tht
is made by man."61 Since no language in the statutory definition of pat-
entable subject matter distinguished living and non-living matter, the
majority refused to infer such a distinction."2
Furthermore, the court rejected the dissent's contention that the Plant
Patent Act, 3 which provides patent protection for certain classes of
plants, precludes the patentability of other living matter.6" The dissent
argued that, had living matter been patentable, the Plant Patent Act
would not have been necessary." The majority concluded, however, that
" 596 F.2d at 987.
7 Id. at 971-73. Stressing the fact that Bergy's claim was for a novel, man-made, pure
culture of a naturally occurring microorganism, rather than a naturally occurring microorga-
nism itself, the CCPA held that Bergy was not claiming patent protection for a product of
nature. Id. at 973-77; see note 41 supra. Although the question of whether the pure culture
was a product of nature had not been raised before the CCPA, the court recognized that as a
procedural matter, when the Board affirms an examiner's rejection generally without revers-
ing the grounds on which the examiner relied, those grounds are affirmed. Id. at 972; see 37
C.F.R. § 1.196(a) (1979). Therefore, since the examiner's rejection of the patent for the pure
culture on grounds that the culture was a product of nature had not been rejected by the
PTO Board of Appeals, the rejection was still viable, and the CCPA had to address the
issue. 596 F.2d at 972-73. The PTO Board had previously determined that Chakrabarty's
man-made microorganism was not a product of nature, and no challenge was made before
the CCPA on that ruling. See id. at 971; see note 41 supra.
" 596 F.2d at 973.
' Id. at 975.
" Id. at 973-75.
596 F.2d at 987 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 2394,
2399).
12 596 F.2d at 985.
'0 Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
161-164 (1976)).
64 596 F.2d at 977-84.
Id. at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting). Judge Miller asserted that Congress recognized the
dichotomy of animate and inanimate matter and that the Plant Patent Act was designed to
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the purpose of the Plant Patent Act was to give horticulture the same
opportunity for patent protection that industry enjoyed, and further, that
Congress was unconerned with the fact that plants are alive." The major-
ity also concluded that the Plant Patent Act's enactment was necessary to
overrule cases holding that man-made strains of plants are unpatentable
under rules prohibiting patents for products of nature."
Judge Miller based his dissent from the Bergy II majority's broad in-
terpretation of the scope of patentable subject matter on the policy lan-
guage in Parker v. Flook and on the Plant Patent Act." The dissenting
opinion proposed that, under Flook, courts must defer any expansive
reading of patent law to Congress if a basis for substantial doubt exists as
to Congress' intent regarding the language in the statute." Judge Miller
contended that the Plant Patent Act established this substantial basis of
doubt, and thus called for congressional action defining the law in this
area.
70
Only Judge Baldwin's concurring opinion recognized any potential re-
lationship between the Supreme Court's discussion of phenomena of na-
ture in Flook and the questions raised by Bergy's and Chakrabarty's pat-
ent claims. 7' Based upon a narrow interpretation of the rules suggested in
Flook and on a broad definition of the phenomena associated with Bergy's
and Chakrabarty's patent claims, Judge Baldwin concluded, however,
that the phenomena of nature rules did not affect Bergy's and
Chakrabarty's claims.72 Citing lengthy passages from the cases cited in
Flook, Judge Baldwin suggested that the cases stood solely for the rule
that an inventor may not wholly preclude others from using a phenome-
permit the first patenting of animate matter. Id. at 1000-01. The majority found, however,
that the Act was designed to stimulate plant breeding by overruling cases holding plants
unpatentable under the product of nature rules, and to change the description requirements
for plants. Id. at 982-84.
" Id. at 982; see text accompanying notes 109-15 infra.
'7 596 F.2d at 982-83; see Ex parte Latimer, 1889 C.D. 123, 125, 46 O.G. 1638 (Commr.
1889) cited in Bergy II, 596 F.2d 952, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to
Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y, 23, 25 (1923) (courts generally regard plants as natu-
ral products, not "discoveries" within context of patent statutes). See also note 41 supra.
U 596 F.2d at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
596 F.2d at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting). Judge Miller contended that by concentrating
on the literal. meaning of the policy language in Flook, the majority in Bergy I missed the
essential thrust of the Flook opinion. Id. The majority held that Flook only proscribed judi-
cial expansion of patent rights when established interpretations of patent law are modified.
Id. at 966-67; see text accompanying notes 19-22 & 53-56 supra. Judge Miller argued tht the
language established a general policy limiting expansion of patent privileges where the sub-
ject matter was not foreseen by Congress. 596 F.2d at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting).
1, 596 F.2d at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting). Judge Miller argued that the only patentable
living matter was covered by the Plant Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976); text accom-
panying notes 63-67 supra.
1' 596 F.2d at 988-96 (Baldwin, J., concurring); see text accompanying notes 23-38
supra.
" 596 F.2d at 996-97 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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non of nature." Judge Baldwin then defined the phenomenon associated
with Bergy's claim as any biological production of a particular antibiotic
and defined the phenomenon associated with Chakrabarty's claim as any
biological metabolism of hydrocarbons.7" Judge Baldwin noted, however,
that Bergy and Chakrabarty were not attempting to wholly preclude the
use of these phenomena, thereby concluding that the phenomena of na-
ture discussion in Flook was inapplicable.7"
The only conclusion common to the three opinions in Bergy 11 was that
the judges saw no relationship between the facts and holding of Flook
and the patent claims of Bergy and Chakrabarty. This fact, coupled with
the judges' three different positions on the dicta in Flook, demonstrates
the inadequacy of the Supreme Court's order demanding the reexamina-
tion of Bergy I in light of Parker v. Flook. An examination of the posi-
tions taken by the judges in Bergy 11 on the relevance of Parker v. Flook
demonstrates, however, that, while the dissent's interpretation of the pol-
icy language in Flook may properly express the Supreme Court's attitude
towards court expansion of patent law, the policy is inappropriate to the
facts of Bergy 1.76 Such examination also reveals that, if properly inter-
preted and applied to the two cases, the phenomena of nature rules would
prevent the patenting of Bergy's pure culture of microorganism,7 while
being inapplicable to Chakrabarty's man-made organism.
78
An adoption by the CCPA of the dissent's interpretation of the policy
language in Flook would have been an improper expansion of that policy.
In its original context, the policy only limited judicial expansion of patent
rights when prior cases construing the patent statutes would be modified
or overrruled in the process.79 In that context, the policy is warranted by
the fact that Congress has the opportunity to modify the patent statutes
in order to overrule cases which interpret congressional policy improp-
erly." Conversely, well established cases construing the patent statutes
Id. at 996 (Baldwin, J., concurring). But see text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
74 596 F.2d at 996 (Baldwin, J., concurring). But see text accompanying note 87 infra.
See also note 34 supra.
73 596 F.2d at 997 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
7 See text accompanying notes 79-82 & 116-18 infra.
See text accompanying notes 83-100 infra.
7' See text accompanying notes 101-102 infra.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972); see note 20 supra; text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
0 Congressional modification of patent law to modify court decisions is exemplified by
the 1952 revision and codification of patent law, in which Congress added the statutory re-
quirement that inventions must be non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The legislative his-
tory of the new requirment shows that Congress recognized that the requirement was estab-
lished law, "but only by reason of decisions of the courts," and that Congress codified the
court made requirement in order to "minimize great departure [from the rule] which [has]
appeared in some cases." S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sass. 7, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2394, 2399-
400; see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
Similarly, prior to the Plant Patent Act of 1930, patents were not issued for plants or
[Vol. XXXVII
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are interpretations of patent law which Congress has approved by its ac-
quiescence, and therfore should only be changed by Congress. In Bergy II,
however, the decision that microorganisms are patentable did not change
any prior court interpretations of the patent statutes to which Congress
had acquiesced, -thus making the policy reiterated by the Supreme Court
in Flook inapplicable. Furthermore, as the majority emphasized, the deci-
sion in Bergy Hf did not expand patent rights, because the cases presented
an issue of first impression." Therefore, by holding living matter patenta-
ble, the CCPA did not open new doors in the patent law, but merely chose
not to close a door through which no one had yet attempted to pass."
The majority's unexplained holding that Bergy's and Chakrabarty's
claims did not involve phenomena of nature" constituted an insufficient
examination of the phenomena of nature rules discussed in Flook." As the
concurring opionion recognized, the importance of the microorganisms is
based on their inherent properties 5 Descriptions of the phenomena, set
forth in the concurring opinion as any biological production of a specific
antibiotic and any biological metabolism of hydrocarbons,8 was, however,
too broad. The proper characterizations of the phenomena should have
been, in Bergy's case, the ability of the specific microorganism to produce
a specific antibiotic, and in Chakrabarty's case, the ability of the specific
microorganism to metabolize hydrocarbons. 7 Therefore, if these phenom-
ena are phenomena of nature, the microorganisms are unpatentable under
the rules discussed in Flook.1Y If, however, the properties of the microorga-
plant products because of decisions that plants are products of nature. See Bergy II, 596
F.2d 952, 982-83 (C.C.P.A. 1979); text accompanying note 67 supra. Congress recognized this
problem and asked rhetorically whether a new variety of plant is an invention. S. REP. No.
315, 71st Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Plant Patent Rep.]; H.R. REP.
No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Plant Patent Rep.]. Con-
gress found that the new strains were inventions, because man caused the changes which
brought about the new strain of plant. Sen. Plant Patent Rep., supra, at 6; H.R. Plant
Patent Rep., supra, at 7.
" 596 F.2d at 966-67.
Although the question of the patentability of living matter had never been raised in
the courts, living matter had been patented. See, Bergy H, 596 F.2d 952, 985-86 (C.C.P.A.
1979); Note, Microbiological Plant Patents, 10 IDEA 87, 94 n.36 (1966). The majority there-
fore recognized that the decision not only did not expand patent law in the sense that ques-
tions of first impression do not open new doors, but also, the decision was in accord with
prior practices of the PTO. 596 F.2d at 985-86.
3 Id. at 965; see text accompanying note 52 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 23-38 supra.
- 596 F.2d at 996 (Baldwin, J., concurring); see text accompanying note 30 supra
(courts look at the underlying value of the subject matter to determine what the phenome-
non of nature is in a given case).
" 596 F.2d at 996 (Baldwin, J., concurring); see text accompanying note 74 supra.
See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948). The
Court defined the phenomenon of nature in the case as "the non-inhibitive quality of certain
strains of species of Rhizobium." Id. This definition contradicts Judge Baldwin's broad defi-
nitions which cover any biological production of the antibiotic and any biological metabo-
lism of hydrocarbons. See 596 F.2d at 996 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
" See text accompanying notes 23-38 supra.
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nisms are the handiwork of Bergy and Chakrabarty, Flook does not pre-
vent the patenting of the microorganisms and the only bar to patentabil-
ity would lie in the PTO contention that living matter is not patentable
subject matter.
In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court relied on Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,89 the facts of which are clearly analogous to
Bergy's case as precedent for the phenomena of nature issue. In Funk
Brothers, the Supreme Court relied on the phenomena of nature rules to
invalidate a patent for a mixture of microorganisms." Scientists had
known that a certain class of bacteria acted as a fertilizer, and that each
strain of the bacteria only fertilized specific strains of a general class of
plants." When mixed, however, the bacteria would not function in their
normal capacity, because the strains of bacteria present in the mixture
mutually inhibited the fertilizing properties of each other." The patented
mixture of bacteria in question in Funk Brothers resulted from the discov-
ery that certain strains of the bacteria were not mutually inhibitive. 3
Given this discovery, a multi-strain bacterial fertilizer was produced
which could be used to fertilize a greater variety of plants than previously
used monoculture -fertilizers." The Supreme Court held, however, that the
bacteria's inherent property of functioning as a fertilizer without inhib-
iting the other bacteria was a phenomenon of nature95 and that the pat-
enting of the mixture would thus be tantamount to patenting a phenome-
non of nature. 8 Furthermore, the Court held that the mixing of the
bacteria in accordance with the discovery of their inherent properties was
not a sufficiently inventive application of the phenomenon of nature to
warrant patent protection. 7
In Bergy II, Bergy sought patent protection for a pure culture of a mi-
croorganism which has the inherent capacity to produce an antibiotic
when subjected to certain fermentation conditions. 8 Despite the fact that
the microorganism only produces the antibiotic when in a man-made pure
culture, this inherent property, like the inherent properties of the fertiliz-
ing bacteria in Funk Brothers, is a phenomenon of nature99 and is unpat-
entable. Furthermore, as in Funk Brothers, the patenting of the pure cul-
ture of microorganism would be tantamount to patenting the phenomenon
of nature, because the microorganism must be in a pure culture in order
- 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
0 Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 128-30.
'= Id. at 129-30.




17 Id. at 130-31.
" 596 F.2d at 967.
" See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1948); text
accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
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to produce the antibiotic.1'0 Therefore, by ordering the reexamination of
Bergy I in light of Parker v. Flook, the apparent intention of the Supreme
Court was that the CCPA should decide the case on the basis of the phe-
nomenon of nature rules and thus avoid the issue of the patentability of
living matter.
Unlike the microorganism in Bergy I and Funk Brothers, the microor-
ganisms in Chakrabarty do not occur in nature in any manner.'"' There-
fore, the inherent properties of this man-made bacterium should not be
considered phenomena of nature,12 and the question of patenting living
matter must be addressed.
The Supreme Court granted the PTO writ of certiorari in Bergy IL.'°3
Shortly thereafter, however, Bergy abandoned his patent claim.0 4 Thus,
only Cliakrabarty is before the Court, with the issue remaining whether
living organisms are statutory patentable subject matter. If Chakrabarty
had not created a new strain of a microorganism by altering the genetic
structure of a naturally occurring bacterium, but instead had synthesized
a living bacterium entirely from inanimate chemical matter, the issue
before the Supreme Court would be placed in a different posture. Under
the PTO's proposed rule excluding living things from patentable subject
matter, this hypothetical microorganism would be unpatentable, even
though its very existence would be attributable to its inventor. However,
the hypothetical microorganism falls directly within the category of pat-
entable subject matter described by Congress as "anything under the sun
that is made by man.'
'0 5
Seen in this light, the PTO has apparently confused the issue of micro-
U* Cf. Gottechalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (computer program not patenta-
ble as phenomenon of nature because only practical use of equation was in relation to the
program); see text accompanying note 31 supra. In Bergy I, the only practical use of the
inherent capacity of the microorganism to produce the antibiotic is when the microorganism
is in a pure culture.
M Bergy I, 596 F.2d 952, 968-70 (C.C.P.A. 1979). Although Bergy only claimed patent
protection for a pure culture of microorganism, and the pure culture does not exist in nature,
the natural phenomenon is the property of the individual microorganism, which does occur
in nature. Id. at 967. Therefore, even though the phenomenon only occurs when the microor-
ganism is in a man-made pure culture, the production of the antibiotic is an inherent quality
of the naturally occurring microorganism. Consequently, the claim should be barred by the
phenomena of nature rules. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
102 In Chakrabarty, the subject matter of the patent claim has been synthesized, and
therefore the properties inherent to the subject matter have also been synthesized. Con-
versely, in Bergy, while the pure culture of the microorganism has been synthesized and does
not exists in nature, the basic unit of the subject matter, the individual microorganisms, do
exist in nature. Therefore the properties of the pure culture, which are actually properties of
the individual microorganisms, are phenomena of nature, despite the fact these properties
are only seen in the unnatural circumstance of a pure culture. See text accompanying notes
34-35 supra.
103 Parker v. Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
"4 [1980] Patent,. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 462, A-11 (Jan. 17, 1980).
' S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2394, 2399.
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organisms being unpatentable because they are alive with the issue of mi-
croorganisms being unpatentable because they are not created by man.
The fact that Chakrabarty has created a new strain of microorganism
cannot be challenged. The question which should control the patentabil-
ity of this microorganism is not whether the creation is alive, but whether
it satisfies the invention requirements of patent law. One commentator
has suggested that because "the essential nature of every living organism
is that it is alive," an organism is not a patentable invention unless its life
is created by the patent applicant. ' This suggestion creates a policy
which has no basis in the patent statutes. The patent statutes provide
protection for "inventions and discoveries."'07 Chakrabarty restructured
the genetic makeup of a microorganism to create a microorganism which
does not exist in nature, which has different properties than the original
microorganism or any other naturally occurring microorganism, and which
asexually reproduces the genetically engineered strain of microorganism."'8
This man-made bacterium is clearly an invention, despite the fact that
Chakrabarty did not create its .life, and is therefore within the scope of
patentable subject matter.
Furthermore, the dissent's contention that the Plant Patent Act pro-
vides the statutory basis for the PTO's position' 9 is clearly erroneous. The
dissent's contention rests on the idea that all animate matter was unpat-
entable until the Plant Patent Act was passed, and that the Act was
passed in order to extend the scope of patentable subject matter to in-
clude limited varieties of plants."10 Neither the Act nor its legislative his-
tory, however, support the position that living things were not, at the
time, patentable subject matter. As described by Congress, the express
purpose of the Act was to "remove the existing discrimination between
plant developers and industrial inventors.""' The discrimination which
existed between plant developers and industrial inventors was not, how-
ever, based on the fact that plants are alive, but rather on two technical
barriers which prevented the patenting of plants. First, plants could not be
described to the degree required by patent law, therefore leaving patent
law inadequate in practice to include plants."' Consequently, Congress
IN Comment, The Patentability of Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re
Bergy, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1978). The note framed the issue as whether § 101
authorizes patents for modified living organisms. Id. at 1362-63. The commentator reasoned,
however, that the modification of a microorganism may remove the microorganism from the
category "product of nature," but "because the organism's life itself has not been created by
the applicant, it must be concluded that no new manufacture or composition of matter has
been invented." Id. at 1362.
107 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
'' 596 F.2d at 968-71.
30 596 F.2d at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
110 596 F.2d at 999 (Miller, J., dissenting); see text accompanying note 65 supra.
" Sen. Plant Patent Rep., supra note 80, at 1; H.R. Plant Patent Rep., supra note 80,
at 1.
" Sen. Plant Patent Rep., supra note 80, at 4-5; H.R. Plant Patent Rep., supra note 80,
at 5.
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reduced the description requirement for plants in the Plant Patent Act."'
Second, courts had denied patents for plants on the grounds that plants
are products of nature.' In the Act's legislative history, Congress ex-
plained why strains of plants made under the supervision of man are not
products of nature, thereby recognizing and implicitly overruling these
decsions."' Therefore, the Plant Patent Act does not preclude the patent-
ability of microorganisms.
The Supreme Court should reject the dissent's restrictive interpreta-
tion of the policy language in Parker v. Flook. The policy suggested by the
dissent would permit the patenting of products of technologies which are
"within the mental reach of ordinary lawmakers,""' while limiting pat-
ents for new technologies which were not contemplated by Congress. The
result of this policy would, therefore, contradict the fundamental purpose
of patent law"' by removing the economic incentive for investment of re-
search money. Furthermore, companies will attempt to reap the economic
benefits of new discoveries by maintaining absolute secrecy, rather than
educating the competition through patent applications and having courts
invalidate the patents on the basis of a policy restricting patents for un-
foreseen technologies. Thus, the restrictive policy would further contradict
the thrust of patent law by hampering the dissemination of new discover-
ies through the disclosure requirements of patent law."'
The Court should also reject the proposal that living things are not
patentable subject matter. The Court should instead focus on the ques-
tion of whether the microorganisms satisfy the invention requirements of
the Patent Act."' Although difficult to apply and badly in need of defini-
tion, the phenomenon of nature and product of nature rules answer the
question of adequacy of invention. Given the confusion surrounding these
rules and the difficulty of clarifying the rules on a case by case basis,
Congress should establish guidelines for determining what is a phenome-
non of nature and what is a patentable application of a phenomenon of
nature. Furthermore, the patenting of living things raises policy questions
which may require the attention of Congress. The Supreme Court should
not, however, refuse to patent microorganisms because of policy matters
which Congress must answer. The Court's only duty in determining the
patentability of microorganisms is to decide whether the patent law ex-
cludes microorganisms because they are alive. The patent statutes give no
M Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, § 2, 46 Stat. 376 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 162 (1976)).
1 See note 67 supra.
"' Sen. Plant Patent Rep., supra note 80, at 6-9; H.R. Plant Patent Rep., supra note 80,
at 7-10.
"I Kiley, Common Sense and Uncommon Bacterium-Is "Life" Patentable?, 60 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y. 468, 474 (1978).
" See U.S. CONST. art I; § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976); text accompanying notes 1 &
3 supra.
" See 35 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11, 13 & 111-114 (1976); text accompanying note 5 supra.
" See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1976); text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
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indication that microorganisms are excluded because they are alive,
therefore, the Court should not create such a barrier.
G. ScoTT RAYSON
